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COURTS

& PROCEDURE

Aviles v. Lutz, 887 F.2d 1046

Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Aviles, brought this action alleging defamation and tortious interference with employment rights against several government
agencies and various individuals acting within the scope of their government employment. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding
that Aviles's action was barred under the doctrines of sovereign immunity, res judicata, and absolute immunity. Aviles appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims against the government agencies. A claim for
money damages against the United States can proceed only if Congress
has waived sovereign immunity and consented to the action. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) waives the government's immunity from tort actions against
the United States, but not against agencies of the United States.
Although under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) the United States must be
substituted as the defendant for individuals acting within the scope of
their government employment, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 exempts from the provisions of section 1346(b) any claim arising out of libel, slander, or interference with contract rights. The district court, therefore, also lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the individuals.
The judgment was affirmed, but remanded with instructions to
enter judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Burghart v. Frisch's Restaurants,Inc., 865 F.2d 1162

Per Curiam
Plaintiffs, Burghart and Gosselin ("Burghart"), brought a successful
action for breach of lease against their commercial tenant, defendant,
Frisch's Restaurants, Inc ("Frisch"). The district court awarded recovery
of the premises, but no interest or damages. Frisch appealed, and the
district court entered a stay of execution of the judgment. The court also
ordered the posting of a supersedeas bond, the terms of which required
the continuation of the monthly rental payments provided in the lease.
Following the Tenth Circuit Court's affirmation of the judgment,
Burghart filed a motion to vacate stay and for supplemental relief.
Burghart attempted to cover the losses caused by Frisch's retention of
the property pending the appeal since the premises could have been rerented at a higher rate. The district court vacated the stay, but denied
supplemental relief holding that neither the original judgment nor the
order fixing the bond on appeal provided for post-judgment relief
broader than possession and receipt of the monthly rental.
On appeal from denial of relief, the Tenth Circuit stated that uncer-
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tainty about the bond's scope cannot subject a party defending an appeal a judgment in its favor to a reduced judgment. Moreover, if
Burghart thought the terms of the bond inadequate, he had a duty to ask
the district court to condition the stay on an obligation greater than the
rental payment required. The court's affirmance of the district court's
refusal for supplemental relief was not based on the failure to object.
Rather, it was based on recognition that the request was outside the relief already granted by the court's original judgment.
Cayman Exploration Cop. v. United Gas Pipeline Corp., 873 F.2d 1357
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Cayman Exploration ("Cayman"), appealed the district
court's dismissal of its claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6), against
United Gas Pipeline Corporation ("United"), for violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"). The district court held that Cayman failed to allege facts
sufficient that, if proved, would entitle Cayman to relief.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling. The court held
that Cayman failed to establish that United practiced unreasonable restraint on trade. Moreover, Cayman did not establish that United was
guilty of vertical or horizontal price-fixing. The court reasoned that Cayman failed to allege facts showing that the parties agreed to set a price
at which the other would resell to third parties. The court also held that
there were insufficient facts to show a conspiracy to establish horizontal
price-fixing. Cayman did not identify the alleged conspirators. Moreover, Cayman did not establish that any companies had acted in a way
contrary to the best interests of their business. In addition, the court
found that Cayman's RICO claim failed. The court stated that a RICO
claim must allege conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Cayman failed to allege racketeering activity with sufficient particularity.
United States ex rel. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Enterprise
Management Consultants, Inc., 883 F.2d 886
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe ("Tribe"), brought
an action against defendant, Enterprise Management, Inc. ("Enterprise"), seeking a declaration that two bingo management contracts
were void. The Tribe subsequently ejected Enterprise from the bingo
premises. The district court then granted Enterprise's motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering the Tribe to return the bingo premises and
prohibiting any future interference. The Tribe appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction, holding that
the district court's order contained no finding of fact or legal conclusion
supporting its holding that Enterprise would suffer irreparable harm if
the Tribe was not enjoined. Moreover, the district court did not balance
the hardships or address Enterprise's likelihood of success on the mer-
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its. Finally, because Enterprise failed to raise substantial and doubtful
questions about the merits of the Tribe's claim, it was proper for the
court to vacate the injunction rather than remand.
Coal CorporationOperating Co. ofAmerica v. Hodel, 876 F.2d 860
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs, Coal Corporation Operating Co. of America ("Coal Corporation"), filed this action in December 1985 to challenge the April
1984 decision by the Secretary of the Interior, Hodel, whereby the federal government assumed responsibility for the surface coal mining inspection and enforcement program of Oklahoma. The district court
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Coal Corporation appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that section 525(a) of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a), requires that
a petition for review of such action be filed within sixty days from the
date of the Secretary's order. The court concluded that the sixty-day
limitation period is jurisdictional and that Coal Corporation's action was
time-barred.
Colorado Building and Construction Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen
Construction Co. and Bank IV, Topeka, N.A. v. Regional Transportation
District, 879 F.2d 809
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Regional Transportation District ("RTD"), appealed a
postjudgment order holding that the security interest of plaintiff, Bank
IV, Topeka, N.A. ("Bank IV"), had priority over RTD's security interest.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the appealability of the magistrate's
postjudgment order under 29 U.S.C. § 1291. The court held that
although the district court undoubtedly had power to enter a final appealable order, this jurisdiction could not be conferred on a magistrate.
Section 636 of the Magistrates Act authorizes a magistrate to enter final
judgments only where the district court designates the magistrate to do
so and where both parties consent. The merits of RTD's appeal from the
postjudgment proceedings could not be addressed until the district
court had reviewed the magistrate's proposed ruling in favor of Bank IV.
The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 890
Author: Judge Seymour (dissented -in part as to sanctions)
Plaintiff, Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. ("EMCI"),
brought suit against defendants, Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe
("Tribe"), and officials of the United States government, seeking injunctive relief. EMCI sought an injunction to prevent the Tribe from enforcing disapproval of a bingo management contract, which the Bureau of
Indian Affairs found in violation of 25 U.S.C. § 81.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case.
The court found that the suit against the Tribe was barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine. In addition, the Tribe did not consent to be
sued. The court also found that EMCI's action could not be maintained
for failure to join the Tribe as an indispensable party. The court reasoned that the action would affect the Tribe's interest in the contract.
The court determined that even though the indispensable party issue
was not previously raised, the issue could not be waived. Moreover, the
court had a duty to raise the issue sua sponte. Finally, the court denied
the Tribe's request for sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Farmer's Insurance Co. v. Hubbard, 869 F.2d 565
Author: Judge Barrett
Defendant, Hubbard, was a former agent of plaintiff, Farmer's Insurance Company ("Farmer's"). The district court found that Farmer's
had terminated Hubbard's employment in bad faith and denied
Farmer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or alternatively, a new trial. On appeal, Farmer's attempted to raise agency issues
not raised to the district court.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that issues not addressed by the
district court will not be considered on appeal. The court found that it
was Farmer's duty to raise all theories, arguments, and issues at the trial
level. Moreover, the court found the jury had sufficient actual evidence
to reach its conclusion and that the conclusion was reasonable.
United States v. Garcia, 879 F.2d 803
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Garcia, pleaded guilty to possessing and distributing a
controlled substance of less than one kilogram in 1986. The district
court subsequently sentenced Garda, requiring him to serve a term of
special parole. Garcia appealed, arguing that the term of special parole

was illegal.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The court
explained that the applicable penalty provision for Garcia's offense was
18 U.S.C. § 1841 (b)(1)(A). This provision required offenders to serve a
term of special parole. In 1984, however, Congress deleted the special
parole term. Congress stated that the deletion of special parole would
become effective November 1, 1987, for offenses involving under one
kilogram. For offenses involving over one kilogram, the deletion of special parole would become effective in 1984. Following Congress' guidelines, the court held that Garcia must serve a term of special parole. The
court reasoned that Garcia's offense involved under one kilogram, and
further, Garcia committed the offense in 1986.
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Glenn v. FirstNational Bank, 868 F.2d 368
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claim against defendant,
First National Bank, alleging that the district court erred in not allowing
them to amend their complaint.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding
that plaintiffs failed to exercise their right to amend their complaint
prior to dismissal and failed to move for a leave to amend their complaint after dismissal.
Harvey v. United TransportationUnion, 878 F.2d 1235
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Harvey, appealed the district court's findings regarding the
legality of defendant, Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Railway Company's
("Railway"), seniority system. Specifically, Harvey claimed that collateral estoppel prevented the Railway from relitigating the issue. Harvey
also appealed arguing that the district court used erroneous legal standards in determining whether the seniority system was legal.
The Tenth Circuit previously determined that Harvey's issue preclusion claim was. never raised formally until over a year after trial, which
was simply too late. The court stated that the notice requirement was
especially important here due to the use of offensive issue preclusion.
Moreover, the court found that the district court made clear legal errors.
In particular, the district court erred in its application of four factors: (1)
whether the seniority system discouraged employees equally from transferring between seniority units; (2) whether the seniority units are in the
same bargaining units; (3) whether the seniority system had its genesis
in racial discrimination; and (4) whether the seniority system was negotiated and whether it has been maintained free from any illegal purpose.
In addition, the district court failed to consider relevant evidence
outside the four factors. The court reiterated the importance of considering the totality of circumstances, even if they are not relevant to the
four factors.
Hilst v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 725
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Hilst, a physician, brought a Bivens action against defendant, Bowen. Hilst sought damages for a prior judicial determination that
his due process rights were violated when he was suspended from participating in the Medicare reimbursement program. Hilst alleged that both
the regulations themselves and the acts of Bowen's employees violated
his due process rights. Bowen moved to dismiss on grounds that the suit
against him in his official capacity was barred by sovereign immunity.
Furthermore, he alleged that the doctrine of respondeat superior was
inapplicable to a Bivens action because there was no allegation of his
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personal involvement. The district court dismissed the claim, holding

that it was against Bowen personally. Hilst appealed.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision but on different grounds. The court ruled that a Bivens action for due process viola-

tions is not available against certain government officials. In particular,
it is not available against officials who administer the Medicare program
when a comprehensive remedy is provided to physicians suspended
from participating in the program. Remedies available to Hilst included

an elaborate administrative hearing and judicial review. Although the
remedial framework did not provide Hilst with consequential damages,
the remedies were found to be adequate and meaningful safeguards.
Jordan v. Shattuck NationalBank, 868 F.2d 383
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Jordan, appealed a directed verdict for defendants on his
claims for tortious breach of a confidential relationship and interference
with contract.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in taking from
the jury the issues of misuse of confidential information, malicious interference with Jordan's contract, and damages. The court reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
Klein v. Commissioner, 880 F.2d 260
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Petitioner, Klein, appealed the tax court's decision sustaining deficiencies in income tax and civil fraud penalties under 26 U.S.C.
§ 6653(b) for the years 1966-1970. The tax court applied the well-established principle that Klein's conviction collaterally estops Klein from denying fraud for purposes of a civil tax case involving the same years.
The Tenth Circuit held that the tax court properly applied the requirements for the application of collateral estoppel. Moreover, the
court stated that new evidence regarding Klein's mental condition which
could have been discovered at the criminal trial did not significantly
change the controlling facts and did not warrant an exception to the
normal rules of preclusion. The court also found that it was within the
tax court's discretion to conclude that the undisclosed suspicion that
Klein was financing narcotics deals did not constitute a special circumstance warranting an exception to the application of collateral estoppel.
The court affirmed the tax court's decision sustaining deficiencies in income tax and civil fraud penalties.
Kunkel v. Continental Casualty Co., 866 F.2d 1269
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Continental Casualty Co. ("Continental"), appealed the
district court's exercise of jurisdiction in rendering a declaratory judgment. The declaratory judgment stated the limits of plaintiff, Kunkel's,
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professional liability coverage, even though such coverage was dependent upon the outcome of a collateral suit which charged Kunkel with
securities law violations.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that pursuant to the DedaratoryJudgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1948), the district court properly exercised
jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the district court's construction of
Kunkel's policy limits not only clarified the legal relations of the parties,
but it also clarified Continental's obligations.
Lake Hefner Open Space Alliance v. Dole, 871 F.2d 943
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Lake Hefner Open Space Alliance ("Lake Heftier"), sought
a reversal of a federal highway administrative decision allowing the construction of a six-lane urban freeway in Oklahoma City. The district
court granted a motion for summary judgment for defendants', Elizabeth Dole, joined by the City of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma City Municipal Improvement Authority. Lake Hefner appealed, arguing that the
district court erred in finding that Lake Hefner had some burden of
proof.
The Tenth Circuit agreed that, in resisting a motion for summary
judgment, the opposing party has a burden to identify genuine issues of
material fact. In response to Oklahoma City's motion, Lake Hefner did
not set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Moreover,
the court was not persuaded that Lake Hefier's issues raised grounds
for reversing the district court decision. The court therefore affirmed
the summary judgment.
Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. PhiladelphiaElectric Co., 878 F.2d 1271
Author: Judge Brorby
Lowell Staats Mining Company ("Staats"), brought suit against defendant, Philadelphia Electric Company and other electric companies
("Electric"), to enforce a judgment. Staats' suit was brought under several theories: alter ego, instrumentality, agency, successor corporation,
and receipt of fraudulent conveyances. The district court removed the
case from Colorado state district court because it found diversity jurisdiction. The district court subsequently dismissed the claims against all
defendants. The court reasoned that the claims were barred by resjudicata. Staats brought two separate appeals which were eventually
consolidated.
The Tenth Circuit upheld all of the dismissals by the district court.
The dismissals against the corporate officers, Robinson, Smith and Culver were upheld because the Officers were found to be in privity with
parties from the first case. Thus, res judicata prevented relitigation of
those claims. The dismissals in favor of the corporations, Minerals Corporation, Pioneer Corporation, Pioneer Nuclear, Inc., and Mesa Operating Limited Partnerships were upheld based on the same principles of
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resjudicata. Moreover, the court upheld the district court's dismissal in
the cases of Umetco and Philadelphia Electric Company, based on the
principle of defensive collateral estoppel. Finally, the court summarily
affirmed the district court's removal of the case to federal court.
Magic Circle Energy 1981-A DrillingProgram v. Lindsey (In re Magic Circle
Energy Corp.), 889 F.2d 950
Author: Judge Brorby
The district court denied petitioners' writ of prohibition to prohibit
the bankruptcy court from exercising in personam jurisdiction over the
petitioners. Petitioners appealed the denial of the writ.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The
court concluded that the district court's denial of the writ was not an
adjudication of the merits of the petitioners' claim and therefore not a
final order subject to appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), the courts of
appeal have jurisdiction over appeals only from final orders of the district courts.
Marshallv. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373
Author: Judge Brorby
A jury awarded plaintiffs, the Marshalls, $350,050 for diminution of
property, $50,000 for nuisance damages and $5,000,000 in punitive
damages relating to improper drilling and plugging of an oil and gas
well on the Marshalls' property. Defendants, El Paso Natural Gas Company and Meridian Oil Production, Inc. ("Meridian"), appealed, asserting errors in three areas by the district court. First, Meridian asserted
that the district court erred in refusing to refer factual issues to the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission ("Commission"), under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Second, Meridian asserted that the district
court improperly excluded evidence critical to its defense. Third, Meridian asserted errors relating to the award of punitive damages. Meridian
first claimed that the award of punitive damages in excess of actual damages required the Marshalls to prove the necessary elements by clear
and convincing evidence. Meridian next contended that the punitive
damages bore no relation to the Marshalls' injuries. Meridian reasoned
that the Commission might intervene and order Meridian to correct the
problems on the Marshalls' property.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court stated that the district court is not required to defer factual
issues to an agency under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction if the issues are routinely considered by the court or if the issues would be
within the conventional knowledge of judges and jurors. Second, the
court was persuaded that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in determining that the probative value of the offered evidence
was outweighed by its potential to confuse the jury. Third, the court
held that the amended Oklahoma statute required the Marshalls to pass
a threshold test of clear and convincing evidence prior to submitting the
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issue of punitive damages to the jury. Once this threshold was met, the
issue was properly submitted to the jury under the standard of preponderance of the evidence to determine the amount of punitive damages.
Moreover, the court held that the district court was without discretion to
reduce or eliminate punitive damages on the basis of events that might
occur after the trial. The court affirmed the decision of the district court.
Martinez v. Sullivan, 874 F.2d 751
Author: Judge Seth
In 1973, the district court enjoined defendants, Sullivan, Secretary
of the United States Department of Heath and Human Services, and
Blue Cross of New Mexico ("Sullivan"), from terminating benefits without an evidentiary hearing. After Sullivan failed to comply, the district
court issued a remedial order to enforce implementation of its previous
order. Plaintiffs Martinez and others similarily situated ("Martinez")
filed a FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to clarify, alter or amend the remedial order. With the motion still pending, Sullivan filed a notice of appeal with the Tenth Circuit for review of the remedial order. Thereafter,
the district court denied Sullivan's Rule 59(e) motion.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that Sullivan's notice of appeal was a nullity
under Rule 4(a)(4) because it was fied before the disposition of the Rule
59(e) motion. Moreover, Sullivan failed to fie a separate notice of appeal following denial of the motion.
Maxey v. Fulton, 890 F.2d 279
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs, Maxey and Cole, two former residents of a state institution for the mentally retarded, alleged violations of their constitutional,
statutory and common law rights against defendant, Borren, the superintendent of the institution. Borren filed a motion for protection from
discovery and a motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. Maxey and Cole moved to compel discovery. Hearings
on all motions were referred to a magistrate. The district court adopted
the magistrate's recommendation that Borren's motion for summary
judgment be denied and that protective orders be considered if discovery became abusive or overly broad. Borren contended that the district
court's order infringed upon his qualified immunity interests and he was
therefore entitled to an appeal of right.
The Tenth Circuit recognized three situations in which denials of
qualified immunity are appealable: (1) where the defendant dearly violated established law and is not entitled to immunity; (2) where, if the
facts are as asserted by plaintiff, defendant is not immune; or (3) where
there is a finding that a disputed material fact exists in the case. The
court held that the order was not appealable on any of these grounds
because the magistrate had merely temporarily denied Borren's motions
in order to allow the parties to develop an adequate factual record on
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which to resolve Borren's immunity claim. The magistrate specifically
stated that Borren could reurge his motion at any time. However, the
court also found that the district court's order did not adequately limit

discovery to the question of qualified immunity. The court reversed the
denial of a protective order and remanded with directions to limit dis-

covery to the qualified immunity issue.
McGeorge v. ContinentalAirlines, Inc., 871 F.2d 952
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, McGeorge, daimed that defendant, Continental Airlines,
violated the Rehabilitation Act and the Federal Aviation Act by requiring her and her guide dog to sit in a seat other than that originally assigned to her. McGeorge also asserted four pendent state claims arising
from her removal from the airplane. McGeorge sought review of orders
from two separate district courts. The district court for the District of
Columbia dismissed McGeorge's federal claim, three of her four state
claims, and transferred venue to the Western District of Oklahoma. The
Oklahoma district court dismissed the remaining claim.
The Tenth Circuit held that it had no jurisdiction over the appeal
from the District of Columbia court and dismissed that portion of the
appeal. The court's jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1),
which directs that appeals from reviewable decisions be taken to the
court of appeals for a circuit embracing the district. The District of Columbia is not within the territory of the Tenth Circuit. Though the order
of the District of Columbia court was not immediately appealable, pending disposition of the Oklahoma claim, it was a reviewable decision
within section 1294(1).
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Oklahoma district court's dismissal
of McGeorge's state battery claim. McGeorge failed to show that the police officer who allegedly committed the battery during her removal
from the airplane was an agent of Continental Airlines. The court also
held that the district court's decision to deny leave to amend the complaint to add a defamation claim was not an abuse of discretion. McGeorge's request came four years after her original complaint, and her
argument that the defamation theory was implicit in the case failed to
convince the district court.
McNickle v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 888 F.2d 678
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, McNickle, appealed from the district court's denial of
McNickle's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) motion to order defendant, Bankers
Life and Casualty Co. ("Bankers"), to pay prejudgment interest.
The Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred by mischaracterizing the Rule 60(a) motion as an original request for prejudgment interest. The court reasoned that the motion was not an original
request because the complaint requested "interest" relief. Moreover,
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McNickle's motion for supersedeas bond put Bankers on notice of their
specific claim to prejudgment interest under Okla. Stat. tit. 36,
§ 3629(B) (Supp. 1986). Also, the district court erred in failing to determine a date certain from which Bankers' liability for prejudgment interest could accrue. Section 3629(B), which establishes the interest period
to be "from the date the loss was payable pursuant to the provisions of
the contract to the date of the verdict," together with the "Stipulated
Facts" and the insurance policy, provided sufficient record from which
to determine the date certain. The court concluded that these errors
constituted an abuse of discretion. The court reversed and remanded
for calculation and for award of prejudgment interest.
Mullen v. Household Bank-FederalSavings Bank, 867 F.2d 586

Per Curiarn
The district court granted the defendant Household Bank-Federal
Savings Bank's ("Household"), motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction based on nondiversity. Plaintiff, Mullen, moved for
leave to amend their complaint and to dismiss the nondiverse defendants. The district court denied the motion on the ground that even if
diversity was established, Mullen's fraud claim was insufficiently stated.
Mullen appealed the denial of their motion to amend.
The Tenth Circuit stated that leave to dismiss nondiverse parties
should be granted freely, unless such amendment would be futile. The
court found that district court had not abused its discretion in denying
the motion. The court also denied Household's motion for injunctive
relief to prevent further action by Mullen because Household failed to
first seek relief in the district court. The court affirmed the district
court's judgment and remanded for determination of the amount of
sanctions to be awarded for Mullen's legally frivolous appeal.
Pytlik v. ProfessionalResources, Ltd., 887 F.2d 1371
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Pytlik, brought this action against defendant, Professional
Resources, Ltd. ("Professional"), and several others, including an Italian corporation. The district court dismissed the action against the Italian corporation for lack of personal jurisdiction and granted
Professional's motion for a directed verdict on its wrongful discharge
claim. Pytlik appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
the defendants' favor on the remainder of Pytlik's claims.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Italian corporation.
In a diversity suit, the plaintiff has the duty to support jurisdictional allegations in a complaint by competent proof of the supporting facts if the
jurisdictional allegations are challenged by an appropriate pleading. Pytlik's complaint failed to allege any facts in support of its conclusory
statement that the Italian corporation was conducting business in

Oklahoma.

DENVER UNIVERSITY IAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:4

The court affirmed summary judgment on the remaining claims,
finding no evidence to support any of Pytlik's allegations. The court further held that the directed verdict of Pytlik's wrongful discharge claim
was improper. A nexus was established between Pytlik's termination and
his hiring of an attorney to pursue his worker's compensation claim.
Thus, the evidence established a prima fade case of retaliatory discharge. The order granting Professional's motion for directed verdict
was reversed and remanded.
Robinson v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 600
Per Curiam
Defendant, Bowen, appealed the district court's decision to award
attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff, Robinson. The Tenth Circuit
held that the district court violated Rule 36.3 of the Rules of Court for
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by relying
upon an unpublished opinion. The court held, however, that the error
was harmless and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision.
Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Oklahoma, 874 F.2d 709
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Oklahoma, brought an action in state court to enjoin
plaintiffs, Seneca-Cayuga and Quapaw tribes (the "Tribes"), from operating high-stake bingo games on Indian trust lands. Oklahoma alleged
that the bingo games violated state gaming laws. The Tribes subsequently brought an action in federal district court seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. Oklahoma then moved the district court to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction because of the pending state action. The
district court denied the motion and enjoined Oklahoma from proceeding with the state court suit against the Tribes and from interfering with
the operation of the bingo games. Oklahoma appealed, asserting that
under the abstention doctrine, the district court should have abstained
from exercising jurisdiction.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit ruled
that the abstention doctrine was not appropriate. The court reasoned
that the activities at issue were primarily of federal interest and outweighed state interests. Hence, the state court lacked jurisdiction. In addition, the court noted that the Tribes were sovereign entities.
Consequently, the state suit was barred because the Tribes did not waive
their sovereign immunity.
Slade v. United States Postal Service, 875 F.2d 814
Per Curiam
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's holding that plaintiff, Slade's, amendment to his complaint did not relate back to the original filing date pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), leading to the district
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court's dismissal of the action because it was time barred. Slade failed
originally to name the proper party defendant, the Postmaster General,
until after the limitations period had passed.
The Tenth Circuit found that notice of Slade's claim was imputed to
the Postmaster General upon serving the Attorney General within the
limitations period. The court reversed and remanded the case, holding
that Slade could amend his complaint, consistent with the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c). The amendment's purpose was to address problems
raised when plaintiffs inadvertently named an improper party in suits
against government agencies or officials. The Tenth Circuit found that
service upon the Attorney General was complete upon mailing, which
had been accomplished one day before the end of limitations period.
Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902
Author: Judge Logan
Petitioners, Smith, filed suit against the state, county, city and various officials alleging violation of the civil rights of Smith's decedent,
who died while in custody in the county jail. After settlement or dismissal of the actions against most of the defendants, the petitioners and
remaining defendants fied a Stipulation for Confidentiality Order and a
Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
41 (a) (1)(ii). Defendant, Judge Phillips granted the order of dismissal but
denied the confidentiality order. Judge Phillips then ordered that the
terms of the settlement be made public.
The Tenth Circuit stayed the orders compelling disclosure of the
settlement terms. The court held that the stipulated dismissal required
no exercise of discretion by the district court, and such unconditional
dismissal divested the district court ofjurisdiction to order disclosure of
the settlement terms. The court granted the writ of mandamus and ordered the sealed settlement document returned to counsel.
Sommermeyer v. Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming, 871 F.2d 111
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Sommermeyer, appealed a court order which upheld rules
of the Wyoming Supreme Court. These rules required an attorney be a
Wyoming resident to be eligible for admission to the bar on motion instead of by taking a bar examination. Sommermeyer argued that the
residency requirement violated the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution.
The Tenth Circuit held Wyoming Supreme Court Rule 5(c) to be
unconstitutional. The case was reversed and remanded with instructions
that Wyoming admit Sommermeyer to the bar of the state.
Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Tripati, brought an action in district court against defend-
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ant, Beaman, the clerk of the court. Tripati contended that Beaman was
not properly processing his papers. The district court dismissed
Tripati's action, finding that Tripati was abusing the court system by
harassing opponents. The district court, therefore placed restrictions on
Tripati's future filings. In particular, the district court directed Beaman
to not file further complaints or pleadings without leave of the court.
Furthermore, if leave were not granted in ten days, Beaman was to return the papers to Tripati.
The Tenth Circuit stated that litigants who have lengthy histories of
abusing the court system must be given notice of and an opportunity to
oppose in writing the district court's order before it is instituted. The
court stated that the district court's injunction did not provide for notice
and an opportunity to oppose the order. Consequently, the court vacated and remanded the district court's judgment which imposed restrictions on Tripati's future filings.
Vaughan v. Smithson, 883 F.2d 63
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Vaughan, brought a breach of contract action in district
court against the defendant, Smithson, for failing to provide their illegitimate child with material and financial support. The district court held
for Vaughan, and Smithson subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Vaughan's claim, while framed in terms
of contract, was nevertheless barred by the domestic relations exception
to diversity jurisdiction. The court concluded that the claim required
consideration of the child's personal needs and finances and the level of
support required of the father. The court stated that state courts, with
their knowledge in domestic relation matters, are better suited to make
such determinations. Consequently, the court vacated the district court
judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Zuchel v. Spinharney, 890 F.2d 273
Author: Judge Phillips, sitting by designation
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of defendant, Spinharney's, motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. The court held that whether the defendant police officer's use
of deadly force in arresting the deceased was objectively reasonable in
light of the circumstances confronting him was a question for the jury.
Given the discrepancies in the testimony, the court concluded that genuine issues of material fact precluded judicial determination of whether
Officer Spinharney's conduct was objectively reasonable.

